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Abstract: The effectiveness of the capital maintenance concept that
became enshrined in British companies legislation during the 19th
century was almost immediately undermined when companies were
permitted to pay dividends from ‘circulating’ capital surpluses, even
though overall there were losses of total invested capital. It is gener-
ally accepted that the British courts were conscious not to limit
management’s capacity to innovate and operate their businesses in
good faith, and to maximize the capacity of their entities to distribute
dividends to shareholders now and in the future. Nevertheless, it is
unclear why at the time some accounting methods were accepted as
being satisfactory in certain situations but not in others. It is argued
here that the British judges adhered to a number of complementary
guiding principles when assessing the validity of particular account-
ing procedures. Central to these principles is the notion that indi-
vidual firms have different planning horizons and associated particu-
lars of risk assessment. These cannot be captured by the general use
of surplus methods of profit determination using current market
prices. Consequently, the courts resisted imposing uniform account-
ing and reporting requirements because traditionally they respected
separation of ownership and control.
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INTRODUCTION
“ . . . the maintenance of corpus has been stretched be-
yond its natural usefulness” [Littleton, 1953, p. 89].
In Britain, the courts provided some of the earliest public
arenas for the examination of accounting practices. Accounting
practices were invariably ancillary to the main issues of cases,
these being disagreements over matters of disclosure and finan-
cial measurement. Disputes classified as disclosure-based gener-
ally concerned the rights of members and directors of compa-
nies to inspect books of account. While these types of cases
outnumbered measurement-related disputes brought before the
courts, many of the key concerns were subsequently resolved
through legislative intervention [Rahman, 1992, pp. 182-184,
191]. In contrast, disputes concerned with measurement issues,
while relatively few, centered on the recurring debate over the
amount of profits available for the purposes of dividend distri-
bution [Reid, 1988, p. 2; Mills, 1993, p. 776]. To resolve such
disputes, judges selectively turned to the notion of capital main-
tenance for guidance.
The doctrine of capital maintenance, the precept whereby
the payment of dividends cannot be made out of capital, was
inherited ostensibly from 18th century British charter corpora-
tions [Mills, 1993, p. 775]. In order to protect creditors a general
consensus emerged. The capital of a company should be main-
tained so as to provide a fund that creditors could conceivably
look to for the payment of their claims. This consensus ulti-
mately became enshrined in law [Gibson, 1971, pp. 26-29;
Benson, 1981, p. 22; Morris, 1986, p. 76].
Despite successive legislative requirements precluding the
payment of dividends out of anything other than ‘profits’, it was
not until the Companies Act, 1980 that a definition of distribut-
able profits was incorporated into legislation.1 This absence ap-
pears to have significantly constrained the British judiciary.
While matters relating to the calculation and payment of divi-
dends clearly fell within the courts’ jurisdiction [Ford, 1993, p.
100], the lack of a substantive definition for the term ‘profits’
limited the judiciary’s ability to make any significant determina-
1 Sections 39 and 40. Additional requirements in relation to investment com-
panies are laid out in section 41, and in relation to insurance companies in
section 42. See also Companies Act, 1985 (U.K.), section 263ff as amended in
1989.
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tions on the issue [Dunn, 1975, pp. 16-17; Morley, 1979, p. 36;
Corcoran, 1993, p. 100].
When applying legislation the courts are generally assumed
to interpret public interest in terms of accepted notions of natu-
ral justice, statutory interpretation and precedent [Peirson and
Ramsay, 1983, p. 292; Mills, 1993, p. 772]. Consequently, com-
mon law emphasizes justice between parties in a process that
results from, and also tends to maintain, a society characterized
by voluntary behavior and customs [Johnson, 1987, p. 67]. It
would seem reasonable to assume, therefore, that the courts
would take a negative view of companies contradicting the capi-
tal maintenance concept. However, in February 1889, Lindley,
L.J. in the English Court of Appeal permitted the defendant in
the case of Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1889),2 a quarry-
ing company, to omit amortization for depletion of its mining
lease when calculating profits available for dividend distribution
[Morris, 1986, p. 71]. In turn, the Lee case provided the prece-
dent for a succession of court cases that effectively marked the
end of the capital maintenance concept as a means of directing
profit and loss for dividend determination [Morris, 1984, p. 59].
French [1977] argues that a common aim amongst Lindley
and the other reforming judges was to ensure effective creditor
protection while at the same time providing significant free-
doms for directors to allocate scarce resources to their best uses.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate this emphasis. With
reference to legal precedents established during the 19th cen-
tury, our intention is to explain the general unwillingness of
British courts at the time to mandate any particular accounting
valuation policy which could inhibit the flexibility of manage-
ment to grow and prosper benefits to the shareholders collec-
tively in the longer term [Littleton, 1953, Ch. 1 & 5].
While French’s work provides a useful framework for un-
derstanding the court’s views on matters of dividend distribu-
tion, it does not provide a comprehensive explanation as to why,
at the time of the Lee case, some accounting methods were ac-
cepted by the courts as being satisfactory in certain situations
but not in others. Moreover, there appears to be no general
consensus in the literature as to the significance or role of capi-
tal maintenance in British judicial reasoning during the 19th
century. This would apply to accounting methods for the pur-
poses of dividend determination, either before or after the Lee
case [Reid, 1987a; 1987b].
2 41. Ch. D. 1.
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It will be argued here that in both pre- and post-1889 peri-
ods, in addition to French’s [1977] principle of ‘freedom for
action’, the courts were also influenced by the authority for any
proposed distribution and by the need for transparency of profit
calculations. These had a variety of affects in terms of fairness
and/or value for money to participants. Furthermore, unifying
these two explanations into a common theme amounts to recog-
nition of the sui generis nature of court decisions under prece-
dent and the specific natures of the situations being encoun-
tered. Taken together, these guiding principles constituted a
logical framework for judicial decision-making which ultimately
conspired against the courts adopting the surplus approach of
profit measurement under economic market valuation. Instead,
they favored the profit and loss or double entry approach for
profit determination and distributive purposes.
The remainder of this paper is divided into seven sections.
The first section provides a brief description of the profit and
dividend requirements contained in 19th century British compa-
nies legislation. The second section provides a summary of the
main approaches available for determining capital maintenance.
The third section reviews the literature regarding capital main-
tenance and the role of the Lee case in defining capital mainte-
nance for judicial purposes. The fourth section details the main
social, economic and institutional influences over British legisla-
tors during the 19th century. The fifth section provides a frame-
work for understanding British judicial reasoning during the
19th century with regard to justifying accounting methods for
the purposes of dividend determination. The sixth section pro-
vides a review of British court cases and judicial reasoning, both
before and after the Lee case, within the context of the frame-
work outlined in section five. The seventh section contains some
concluding remarks about the links between present develop-
ments in cost and management accounting and the financial
reporting function for organizations as a whole, and raises
doubts about the use of microeconomic measures outside of
perfect markets.
BRITISH COMPANIES LEGISLATION
DURING THE 19TH CENTURY
Early British examples of the legislative rule relating com-
pany profits to dividends can be found in the Joint Stock Com-
panies Registration and Regulation Act, 1844 and the Compa-
nies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. While the 1844 Act
4
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provided that registered companies could declare dividends out
of profits, the 1845 Act was more specifically formulated with a
view of statutory companies’ capital as the minimum value of
the net assets which must be raised initially and then, so far as
possible, retained in the business [Gower, 1979, p. 98]. Accord-
ingly, the 1845 Act provided that the company shall not make
any dividend whereby its capital stock will be in any degree
reduced [clause 121].
Both the 1844 and 1845 Acts treated dividend policy as an
aspect of capital maintenance generally, principally because the
interests of shareholders and creditors were regarded as being in
competition. Assets distributed to one group are not available
for distribution to the other. Given that the power to determine
dividends is delegated to directors by shareholders, then credi-
tors were often in a relatively disadvantaged position [Ford,
1993, p. 92].
Following Parliamentary acceptance in 1855 of the principle
of limited liability for joint stock companies (Limited Liability
Act, 1855), British company law was consolidated in the Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1856. Following almost 20 years of re-
form, the 1856 Act integrated the Joint Stock Companies Regis-
tration and Regulation Act, 1844 and the Limited Liability Act,
1855, as well as introducing other changes. Most evidently, the
provisions relating to profits and dividends contained in the
1844 Act were not replicated in the 1856 Act itself but were
inserted in the model Articles of Association [Ford et al., 1999,
pp. 38-41]. While the Articles specified that dividends should
only be paid out of profits and that a model ‘full and fair’ bal-
ance sheet should be drawn up so as to give a true and correct
view of companies’ financial affairs [Hein, 1978, pp. 171-172],
the 1856 Act provided no guidance regarding the underlying
accounting principles to be applied [Bryer, 1998, p. 57; Maltby,
1998, p. 11]. Moreover, being relegated to the model Articles
meant that the disclosure requirements were optional.
Several consolidating acts followed the introduction of the
1856 Act, culminating in the Companies Act, 1862. Like the 1856
Act, the 1862 Act contained no compulsory accounting or audit-
ing provisions dealing directly with the payment of dividends. As
with the 1856 Act, all such provisions were contained in the
model Articles of Association. For instance, Article 73 (Table A)
provided that no dividend should be paid except out of the prof-
its arising from the business of the company. Table A also sug-
gested that before recommending any dividend, the directors
could, but were not compelled to, set aside out of profits for the
5
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company a reserve fund for repairing or maintaining the works
connected with the business of the company.
Companies legislation introduced in Britain during the 19th
century was customarily drafted with the purpose of protecting
creditors by allowing a proportion of the nominal value of the
share capital either to remain uncalled or to be retained within
the company [Hadden, 1972, p. 70]. However, this purpose was
eventually undermined when companies issued capital fully
paid. Furthermore, as there were no legal requirements that the
liabilities secured by companies were to bear any reasonable
relationship to the company’s assets, or that the original capital
should be paid to the company in cash, a company could con-
tinue to trade despite having lost a substantial proportion of its
capital courtesy of legitimate trading losses.3
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF CAPITAL MAINTENANCE
Two broad approaches have been identified by the courts
for determining profits for dividend determination. One of these
models can be described as the ‘surplus’ approach, whereby the
profit and loss statement plays a secondary role to the balance
sheet by only verifying the accuracy of the underlying calcula-
tions. Profit is determined as the difference in net asset valua-
tions adopted at the beginning and the end of the financial pe-
riod [Kehl, 1976]. For instance, in Binney v Ince Hall Coal and
Cannel Company (1866),4 Kindersley, L.J. suggested that in de-
termining net profits:
The first step would be to make good the capital by
taking stock and putting a value upon all the assets of
the company, of whatever nature, and deducting there-
from all the liabilities (including amongst those liabili-
ties the amount of contributed capital), and the surplus,
if any, then remaining of the gross receipts would be
net profit.5
Similarly, Fletcher Moulton, J. remarked in re Spanish Pros-
pecting Co Ltd (1911)6 that:
3 Section 13 of the Companies Act, 1855 provided that companies were to be
wound up and dissolved when three quarters of their capital had been lost.
However, this provision was not repeated in subsequent legislation [French,
1977, p. 315].
4 35 L.J. Ch. 363.
5 See also City of Glasgow Bank v Mackinnon (1882) 9. Court Sess. Cases, 4th
Series, 535 (Court of Session, Scotland).
6 1. Ch. 92; (1908-1910) All E.R. Rep. 573.
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‘Profits’ implies a comparison between the state of a
business at two specific dates usually separated by an
interval of a year. The fundamental meaning is the
amount of gain made by the business during the year.
When viewed as an accretion to the original investment, the
existence of profits under the surplus approach implies that the
removal of the surplus would leave a balance of assets equal in
value to the original amount of the investment. Accordingly,
profit determination under a surplus approach requires entities
to incorporate changes in the value of all of their assets, includ-
ing non-current and fixed assets, in the computation of profit
[Kehl, 1976, pp. 3-13]. This approach also implies, by necessity,
specifying the concepts of capital and capital to maintenance be
adopted [Jones and Aiken, 1994, p. 201]. Therefore, profits un-
der a surplus approach suggest that capital has been maintained
for the owner under the proprietary theory of economics, which
implies general application of market buying or selling prices
current at period’s end [Revsine, 1981].
The alternative to the surplus approach concentrates upon
the profit and loss account as the primary evidence of the avail-
ability of profit. Described as the ‘profit and loss account
method’, profit has been determined by the courts as the excess
of total revenues received within a financial period, over that
proportion of each production input’s purchase price allocated
in proportion to the contribution it makes to each period’s rev-
enues. In addition, a comparison might also be made of the
opening and closing values of the inventory and other assets
intended to be consumed or turned over within the business
cycle. Any difference is then added or deducted from the differ-
ence between revenue receipts and expenditures [Ford and Aus-
tin, 1995, p. 663].
The profit and loss method places most importance on
those financial transactions in which the specific reporting en-
tity is directly involved, and little or no emphasis on the current
market values of assets, particularly non-current or fixed assets.
Nevertheless, the market prices of non-current or fixed assets
may become relevant in certain circumstances, but only as
proximate justifications of certain ‘unexpired costs’ by auditors.
The profit and loss method, therefore, is driven primarily by the
conventions of revenue recognition for a legal entity and by the
matching principle of relevant costing under double entry
[Littleton, 1953, Ch. 2 & 5]. Relevance is in relation to
management’s business strategies and the specific nature of the
expenditures involved [p. 55].
7
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The existence of profits under the profit and loss account
method may or may not mean that capital has been maintained
overall in terms of market prices in a proprietary sense of eco-
nomic ownership. It ultimately depends upon whether or not
market events have occurred, and the ways in which they have
interacted during the financial period as a timing issue congru-
ent with managerial strategies. For example, the unrealized loss
on the value of a current asset could be completely offset by an
unrealized gain on a non-current asset. Nevertheless, under tra-
ditional accounting procedures and for dividend determination
purposes, any unrealized gain is unlikely to be accounted for
whereas any unrealized loss will almost certainly be incorpo-
rated in the final profit figure. Historically, this is in accordance
with the ‘lower of cost or market’ principle. However, it should
be noted that professional accounting standards have increas-
ingly permitted management to use the option of adopting
management values, historic costs or current market prices for
financial accounting and disclosure purposes. Under the separa-
tion of ownership and control it is management’s perception of
the unexpired cost of assets yet to be allocated, not the general-
ity of market prices, which is relevant.
By incorporating changes in the values of all assets and
limiting managements’ discretion over the timing of revenue
and expense recognition, the surplus approach could possibly
provide a more theoretically rigorous measure of profit that is
relatively less susceptible to managerial opportunism or conser-
vatism [Chambers, 1966; Baxt, 1970]. It might also provide a
means of measuring profit that is most closely aligned with the
economic view under this concept of accountability and control
[Edwards and Bell, 1961; Sterling, 1971]. However, this presup-
poses that assumptions and deductive logic can replace compli-
ance with social codes for general acceptance of managements’
responsibilities for strategic planning and operations. Accord-
ingly, both the British judiciary and accounting profession re-
jected the surplus method in favor of the profit and loss account
method for a variety of legal, ethical and commercial reasons
[Weiner, 1928, pp. 1046-1050; Littleton, 1934, pp. 140-148;
Yamey, 1962; Kehl, 1976; Jones and Aiken, 1994, p. 202]. Never-
theless, differences of opinion still exist amongst academics as
to whether the Lee case represented a ‘watershed’ in terms of
legal precedent with respect to the doctrine of capital mainte-
nance. The matter can be somewhat clarified by Beaver and
Demski’s [1979] view that current market prices can be gener-
ally applied in perfect markets.
8
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LITERATURE SURVEY
Published work on court cases dealing with disputes over
the payment of dividends and capital maintenance tends to view
the Lee case as a turning point in British judicial precedent.
Interestingly though, there appears to be no general consensus
as to the status of capital maintenance prior to 1889. Some
authors have suggested that prior to this date the British courts
refrained from imposing a capital maintenance view with regard
to accounting matters, except to enforce private contracts or to
redress fraud.7 Therefore, the Lee decision was consistent with
the judicial precedent laid down in previous cases. An alterna-
tive view is that prior to 1889 the courts attempted to protect
creditors by advocating a ‘capital maintenance view’ and refused
to permit the payment of dividends out of capital [Reid, 1987a,
p. 10]. Consequently, the Lee decision marked a change in the
law.8
Based on the findings from pre-Lee cases, Reid [1987a]
claims that it was not uncommon for British judges to reject
contractually-based accounting and dividend policies if they
contravened the capital maintenance doctrine or other equitable
considerations. Nevertheless, no consistent conceptual declara-
tions of asset valuation and income determination were evident
[Reid, 1987b, p. 247]. Furthermore, prior to 1889 the provision
for depreciation received support although “not all decisions
were in accord” and “no consistent concept of profit or deprecia-
tion emerged” [Reid, 1988, pp. 2-3].
Bryer [1998] suggests that prior to the Lee decision judicial
views on asset valuation and income determination were consis-
tent with Dicksee’s [1903] concept of ‘capital-revenue account-
ing’ (CRA). However, following the Lee case, general agreement
on CRA evaporated. Consequently, Bryer [1998, p. 57] argues
that the Lee case signaled the end of the general acceptance of
CRA. Bryer discusses Napier’s [1997] suggestion that the Lee
decision was ‘anomalous’ in the sense that it was consistent with
the feudal law of settlement trusts, suggesting lingering feudal
attitudes amongst the judiciary. However, he rejects Napier’s
thesis on the grounds that it is inconsistent with his own views
7 For instance, Dickinson [1904, p. 71], Hatfield [1916, p. 203], Weiner
[1928, p. 1051], Edwards [1939, p. 179], May [1943, p. 52] and Johnston [1961,
p. 545].
8 For instance, Palmer [1898, p. 147], Strachan [1910, p. 233], Robson [1927,
p. 266], Briggs [1934, p. 228], Cooke [1937, p. 440], Yamey [1941, p. 274], Gower
[1954, p. 112], Edey and Panitpakdi [1956, p. 378] and French [1977, p. 307].
9
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on the general socialization of capital. Furthermore, while the
accounting allowed in Lee was feudal in form, it was not feudal
in substance [Bryer, 1994], nor was the accounting in subse-
quent cases such as Verner v General and Commercial Investment
Trust (1894)9 [Cooper, 1894]. Nevertheless, Bryer’s view that
managers in the 19th century were functionaries of investor or
establishment interests may require some modification given
the nature of the legal and accounting decisions and practices
emphasized here.
A.C. Littleton, arguably the pre-eminent American account-
ing scholar and historian of the first half of the 20th century,
discussed the extent of general agreement with decisions by the
courts [Littleton, 1933, p. 221]. This is interesting as Littleton
had a marked affinity with and knowledge of the ‘historical evo-
lution’ [1953, pp. 84-89] of accounting in both the UK and the
USA during the previous one hundred years.
The central premise of Littleton’s [1953] views on account-
ing was the overriding need for flexibility in measuring periodic
performance of the whole organization, especially when long-
term planning was involved. His belief was that managers have
been given flexibility to the extent necessary to fulfill business
activities and strategies in terms of community needs [1953, p.
55 & Ch. 5]. This appears to have grown out of his historical
interpretation of the growth of regulation [1953, Ch. 1 & 6].
Given this focus, Littleton argued that the purpose of account-
ing is “(T)o make possible the periodic matching of costs (ef-
forts) and revenues (accomplishments)” [1953, Ch. 2]. Further-
more, there must be a congruency between the measurement of
costs for reporting purposes and managements’ strategies and
accomplishments (periodic revenues) for the organization as a
whole. Managements’ congruent costing at period’s end (includ-
ing unexpired costs of fixed assets) in terms of overall strategic
plans coincided with Littleton’s own edict of fairness amongst
competing parties [1953, Ch. 1 & 2, pp. 84-95]. Consequently, in
his view, capital maintenance is a policy option of management
and not a fundamental objective for accounting itself [1953, p.
23]. Moreover, no current market price can have a general status
of fairness applicable to all firms [1953, Ch. 12], particularly
where long-term strategies for periodic assets exist [see also Bell
et al., 1997].
Littleton knew from examining over four hundred years
of history that managements’ attempts to adopt their own
9 2. Ch. 239.
10
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‘exchange values’ for fixed and current assets generally had been
too hazardous in practical terms [1953, p. 84]. While possibly
relevant and theoretically consistent in financial terms with
managements’ economic planning and financial strategies,
management’s valuation in exchange was impracticable for gen-
eral use because of speculation and reporting abuses [1953, p.
85]. Thus, Littleton elected to revive and support the general
application of historical cost. This move was expedient, not
ideological, in that it brought together his logical and historical
reasoning for congruent values in exchange and generalized
conservatism. However, cost as the central focus for accounting
units remained, as it remains today, with revenues as compensa-
tion and profit as reward [Littleton, 1953, p. 95].
The profit and loss method under Littleton’s [1953, pp. 84-
91] structure, whereby established professional justification pro-
cedures provide for methodological objectivity [Dewey, 1947] to-
gether with periodic costing relevant to management’s existing
strategies, represents the core of his structural theory. This pro-
cess does not in itself justify the generalized expediency of man-
datory historical cost. Strictly speaking within the framework,
costs are specific to managerial strategies for the firm in its
environment. Under more recent professional attempts at stan-
dardization these might often be justified through the use of
historic and current market prices as surrogates for manage-
ment values in exchange. Nevertheless, generalization cannot
posit some kind of ideal for accounting practice. The environ-
ment for observation of a complex set of operations under
longer-term planning has different conditions for observation
and more variety in its natural setting than does observation for
valuing a corner store in a perfect market at two points in time.
Accountants had grown to understand this complexity of pro-
duction issues as the emphasis for relevant periodic costing
since the 17th century [Howard, 1932]. In fact, professionalism
in accounting practice had moved, and continues to move, to-
wards providing credibility for reduced reliance on non-proxi-
mate market prices as values.
Littleton’s argument, which is accepted here as having been
adopted by the courts, is that the gradual movement away from
market valuation methods at discharge of venture responsi-
bilities to periodic income determination as a product of the
double entry system was scientific [1953, pp. 80-90]. It reflected
evolutionary changes in various social, commercial and legisla-
tive conditions. Moreover, legislators never intended managers
to be overwhelmed or thwarted by charge/discharge financial
11
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reporting of valuations reflecting shorter-term perspectives, a
problem evident in many securities markets today. The success
and security of investment plans for the contribution of capital
by shareholders collectively were agreed to be important. How-
ever, these issues had to be placed in perspective against the
invention and growth of goods and services for the community
as a whole. For instance, the Joint Stock Companies Registra-
tion and Regulation Act, 1844 was introduced to assist produc-
tive enterprises towards longer-term objectives for invention, in-
novation and growth. Consequently:
The maintenance of capital is indeed important, but
maintenance is an objective of management policy . . .
The proper matching of costs and revenues carries the
relation of capital and income further than does the
relation of principal and interest. The action of match-
ing treats capital as a means, income as an end
[Littleton, 1953, p. 23].
Emphasis by the courts on freedom of contract over arbi-
trary and restrictive creditor and shareholder protection propos-
als and concepts appears to have mirrored the nature and gen-
eral tenet of companies legislation introduced by the British
Parliament during the 19th century.
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONTEXTS
Dicey [1905; 1914] argues that after 1825, British legislative
history comprised two relatively distinct periods of ‘laissez-faire’
individualism (1825 to 1868) and ‘collectivism’ (1868 to 1900).
Company legislation introduced and adopted during the laissez-
faire period generally aimed at avoiding any restrictions over
freedom of contract [Dicey, 1914, p. 146]. In contrast, the collec-
tivist era was characterized by company legislation designed to
secure protections such as compulsory financial disclosure, par-
ticularly for those individuals who lacked influence over the di-
rectorate [Dicey, 1914, p. 264]. While convenient as a framework
for examining the evolution of corporate legislation for disclo-
sure in Britain during the 19th century [Jones and Aiken, 1995;
1999], Dicey’s [1905; 1914] thesis has been subject to a number
of criticisms [Brebner, 1948, p. 71; Roberts, 1961, pp. 78-83;
Cosgrove, 1980, pp. 171-194; Perkin, 1981, pp. 57-60; Walker,
1996, pp. 306-312].
Questions about Dicey’s [1905; 1914] framework highlight a
number of issues, including characteristics of laissez-faire and
collectivist elements in both pre- and post-1870 legislation
12
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[MacDonagh, 1977, pp. 9-11; Wood, 1982, p. 126; Harris, 1992,
p. 118]. Also, multiple political and public doctrines either com-
pete against or encapsulate laissez-faire and collectivist ideolo-
gies [Parris, 1960, pp. 35-36; Parris, 1969, p. 273; Lubenow,
1971, p. 9; Henriques, 1979, p. 260; Robb, 1992, pp. 17-18, 148-
158]. The malleability of definitional boundaries is also a prob-
lem [Taylor, 1972, p. 12; Holmes, 1976, pp. 683-685]. While im-
portant, the debate surrounding Dicey’s division of public policy
making in Britain into distinct periods is relevant here only to
the extent that it highlights two significant themes: (1) the ap-
parent coexistence of both laissez-faire/economic liberal and
collectivist/interventionist ideologies in 19th century British
companies legislation [MacDonagh, 1977, pp. 9-11; Wood, 1982,
p. 126; Checkland, 1985, pp. 158-159]; and (2) the general ascen-
dancy of economic liberal strategies in social and macro-
economic policy up until the early 20th century [Crouch, 1967,
p. 199; McCord, 1970, pp. 126-128; Taylor, 1972, p. 39; Crouzet,
1982, pp. 108-109; Parker, 1990, pp. 54-59; Robb, 1992, p. 189].
Undoubtedly, any attempts to categorize history into dis-
crete and coherent periods is likely to yield anomalies. For in-
stance, while the 1840s and 1850s have been described as the
high point of laissez-faire in Britain [Court, 1962; Hobsbawm,
1973, p. 190ff], there appeared to be implicit acceptance of state
intervention to secure individual rights and to protect private
property [Dicey, 1914, pp. 260-261; Taylor, 1972, pp. 53-64;
Paul, 1979, pp. 47-48]. Furthermore, Maltby [1998, p. 14] argues
that laissez-faire is not, in itself, an adequate explanation for the
way in which companies were regulated during the 1850s and
1860s:
Although politicians invoked laissez-faire, they were not
prepared to pursue it rigorously, because of the impos-
sibility of making a clear distinction between the pres-
ervation of individual and collective rights [Maltby,
1998, p. 12].10
Consequently, it appears that legislators were not trying to do
away with company regulation, but merely seeking to identify a
minimalist framework within which companies could operate
[Maltby, 1998, p. 13].
Despite the important restrictive disclosure and auditing
provisions contained in the 1844 and 1845 Acts, both were in
substance more liberal than restrictive in character. Underlying
10 See also Brebner [1948, p. 71], Perkin [1969, p. 325; 1981, pp. 57-68] and
Seaman [1972, p. 170].
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the 1844 and 1845 Acts was the expectation by legislators that
economic progress through capital centralization and the result-
ant economies of scale in production would contribute towards
economic prosperity [Court, 1962; Hobsbawm, 1973]. Accord-
ingly, one of the principal tasks of limited liability was to eman-
cipate free enterprise by harnessing the increasing glut of do-
mestic investment capital that had appeared because of the
Industrial Revolution [Dicey, 1914, p. 202; Hunt, 1936, p. 118ff].
For example, during the 1790s, industry funding needed for
merchandise and other inventories and fixed capital formation
were on an equal footing. However, by 1835 the fixed capital
needs of industry were three times that of merchandise and
inventory requirements combined [Crouzet, 1972, pp. 32-33].
Accordingly, neither the 1844 or 1845 acts represented simply
an attempt to increase investment opportunities for banks and
other financial institutions.
As the demands for increasingly larger and more productive
plant began to outstrip the ability of banks to accommodate
effectively the ensuing requests for funds, the banks responded
by gradually withdrawing from long-term industrial involve-
ment [Littleton, 1953, Ch. 5]. As a consequence, the responsibil-
ity for long-term funding of industry and commerce increasingly
fell to the mechanism of limited liability [Jefferys, 1938, p. 160;
Goodhart, 1972, p. 135; Kennedy, 1976, p. 160]. The vast major-
ity of private companies initially availed themselves of limited
liability to reduce risks associated with soliciting investments
from close associates [Lavington, 1921, p. 208; Jefferys, 1938, p.
119; Kennedy, 1976, p. 161] or ‘inside’ investors [Bryer, 1998;
Maltby, 1998]. However:
. . . when private or internal resources were insufficient
and short term bank accommodation was too limited
and risky, British firms and entrepreneurs after the
1880’s were forced to turn to the second means of
implementing limited liability, that of public quotations
on a stock exchange [Kennedy, 1976, p. 162].
Both Jefferys [1938] and Bryer [1997] contend that the in-
troduction of limited liability was in the interests of capitalists
seeking suitably large investments. Likewise, Maltby [1998, p.
30] argues that:
The interests of large investors, the ‘merchant bankers
and merchant princes’ . . . predominated throughout.
Limited liability favoured them, by offering the possi-
bility for profitable but less risky investment.
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However, notwithstanding the benefits provided by limited li-
ability to large investors, the legislation also benefited entrepre-
neurs with innovative ideas by providing them with more ready
access to capital. This occurred despite their initial cautious
behavior. For instance, the preponderance of high denomination
company shares with large reserves of uncalled capital [Maltby,
1998, pp. 19-20] could be interpreted as typical of an immature
market in which creditors were hesitant to relinquish old lend-
ing habits. Consequently, directors were compelled to act as if
they were operating unlimited liability companies [Kennedy,
1976].
Most significant compulsory British companies legislation
was passed during the ‘collectivist’ era.11 Much of this legislation
either introduced compulsory disclosure and auditing require-
ments, or else strengthened and modernized pre-existing audit-
ing and accounting provisions. However, the move towards col-
lectivism was not necessarily at the expense of freedom of
contract. For instance, the 1862 Act provided that companies
were required to adopt the set of articles provided in the Act
unless shareholders and directors specifically negotiated a set
[Jones and Aiken, 1995, p. 76].
The shift back to disclosure requirements evident in the
Companies Act, 1900 can be tied directly to increasing absentee
ownership, and the concomitant disappearance of financial in-
termediaries [Kennedy, 1976, p. 164]. Maltby [1998, pp. 27-28]
argues that the general fall in nominal values of shares, com-
bined with a declining use of uncalled capital, had a significant
impact during the last third of the 19th century:
Diversification by large investors, as well as increased
participation by small ones, meant that the limited li-
ability company was running into problems of the sepa-
ration of ownership and control.
Nevertheless, it appears that the legislators were aware of the
problems associated with the separation of ownership and con-
trol before the advent of the collectivist era.
While the disclosure and auditing provisions contained in
the 1844 and 1845 Acts may have discriminated against small
investors, their introduction was specifically directed at the
11 For instance, the Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, the Life Assurance
Companies Act, 1870, the Gaswork Clauses Act, 1871, the Metropolis Water Act,
1871, the Building and Friendly Societies Act, 1874, the Companies Act, 1879,
the Electric Lighting Act, 1882, the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 and the
Companies Act, 1900 [Brown, 1905; Dicey, 1914; Edey and Panitpakdi, 1956].
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prevention of willful acts of ‘fraud and illegality’. Compulsory
accounting disclosure was not necessarily invoked as a remedy
for companies ‘faulty in their nature’ or ‘fraudulent in their ob-
jects’. It was recommended as a means of warding off ‘misman-
agement’ by making directors answerable increasingly to ‘out-
side’ shareholders [Maltby, 1998, p. 18]. Hence, restrictive
accounting provisions were specifically linked by the legislators
to the protection of private property and the maintenance of law
in line with classical economic philosophies of regulation [Jones
and Aiken, 1995, pp. 69-70].
Against this backdrop of legislative and economic change,
the accounting profession was undergoing significant changes
of its own. Based on the listings in the London Post Office Di-
rectory, the number of accountants increased dramatically be-
tween 1860 and 1880 from 264 to 700. Following on from this,
in 1870 the Institute of Accountants was formed in London. It
was subsequently merged with a number of other professional
accounting associations in 1880 to form the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants in England and Wales [Edwards, 1989, p.
277].
Several authors have linked this growth in the accounting
profession to changes in companies legislation and the market
for company shares [Maltby, 1998; Bryer, 1998, p. 59]. Joint
stock companies registered under the Companies Act, 1844 were
required to comply with a series of provisions relating to the
production and registration of audited balance sheets [Maltby,
1998, p. 11]. While these mandatory requirements were not car-
ried over to the 1856 and 1862 Companies Acts, a number of
specific industries were subsequently required to adopt compul-
sory disclosure and/or audit requirements. For instance, disclo-
sure requirements were introduced for gas companies (Gaswork
Clauses Act, 1871) and for electricity companies (Electric Light-
ing Act, 1882). Compulsory disclosure requirements and audit
requirements were also introduced for railway companies
(Regulation of Railways Act, 1868), water companies (Metropo-
lis Water Act, 1871) and joint stock banks (Companies Act,
1879) [Morris, 1993; Jones and Aiken, 1995, p. 72].12 Conse-
quently:
12 After 1868, auditing and accounting preparation provisions also appeared
in a number of Acts relating to the governance of counties, municipalities and
parishes, such as the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 [Brown, 1905, pp. 319-
320].
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. . . as a more dispersed group of investors was begin-
ning, albeit slowly, to demand accounting information,
an accounting profession was emerging which could
supply that information” [Maltby, 1998, p. 28].
While auditing and financial disclosure requirements were
eventually granted compulsory status in the Companies Act,
1900 [Edey and Panitpakdi, 1956], audits could have been per-
formed by arrangement for such companies and institutions as
the Forth and Clyde Navigation Company (1786) using govern-
ment loans in earlier times [Forrester, 1980]. In later times,
trustee and government monies would have been audited in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Exchequer and Audit De-
partments Act, 1866.13 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that govern-
ment inspectors would have accepted anything but financial
statements drawn up by fully skilled financial professionals
[Funnell, 2004].
Even though companies legislation provided managers with
the freedom to act as innovators in reporting, accountants do
not appear to have been passive participants, and many made
formative moves to establish themselves as recognized authori-
ties on accounting practice. As such, they would have been vocal
about the need for flexibility of directors, as their clients, to
achieve their longer-term plans [Lavington, 1921, p. 213;
Jefferys, 1938, pp. 295-314; Kennedy, 1976, p. 168; Maltby, 1998,
p. 28]. On the other hand, economic advisors to investors and
creditors would have noted the increasing opportunities for sup-
plying their services under the new arrangements for lending
and the transfer of securities, as well as the need for safeguards
in such an environment.
INTERPRETATIONS OF JUDICIAL REASONING
While the uncertainty evident with respect to legislative ori-
gins raises questions about whether court cases can reveal fun-
damental principles of accounting, or of law itself [Rahman,
1992, p. 185], it is possible that one can overemphasize these
problems. Accordingly, it will be argued here that questions ad-
dressed by the law in considering the acceptability of particular
accounting methods for the purposes of dividend determination
have usually focused upon: (1) authority for the distribution; (2)
transparency of its effects in terms of fairness and/or value for
13 29 & 30 Vict. Cap. 39.
17
Arden and Aiken: Accounting history of capital maintenance: Legal precedents for managerial autonomy in the United Kingdom
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200540
money to participants; and (3) managerial freedoms to provide
for the on-going capacity for distribution.14
With respect to the authority for the distribution, it appears
that English judges during the 19th century entertained a hierar-
chy of priorities consistent with legislative priorities. This hier-
archy of priorities began with evolving customs and legislative
provisions. For instance, despite the courts generally embracing
freedom of contract, there were occasions prior to the Lee case
when they returned to older principles of equity [Atiyah, 1979,
p. 404, in Mills, 1993]. Some of these more traditional principles
of equity are evident in companies legislation, such as in the
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1862. Once it was clear that legisla-
tive provisions were not being breached, the courts reasoned
down to non-compliance with contracts and other specific con-
straints on persons and firms. Consequently, the capital mainte-
nance requirement was only enforced when clear-cut violations
of the law occurred [Johnston, 1961, p. 545; Keown and Mann,
1956, p. 163].
In their attempts to evaluate the transparency, fairness and/
or value for money of profit calculations and dividend pay-
ments, the judiciary was compelled to pay particular attention
to specific revenues and expenses. They were undoubtedly as-
sisted towards this end by the increasing popularity of the
double account system [Dicksee, 1895, pp. 117-120; Yamey,
1962; Edwards, 1985, p. 19]. While the double account system
comprises a method of classifying the balance sheet, a detailed
profit and loss account is a conventional feature of this system
[Parker, 1990, p. 66; Jones and Aiken, 1994, pp. 202-204]. More-
over, the production of a profit and loss statement is integral to
the objectives of the double account system, which are: (1) to
demonstrate stewardship or accountability about how capital
raised by companies is used or spent; and (2) to distinguish
capital from revenue expenditure [Carter, 1937, pp. 1024-1026;
Morris, 1993, p. 172].
With respect to managerial freedoms, the increasing distinc-
tion between shareholders and directors after 1856 led the
courts to adopt the view that financial accounting was primarily
determined by the priorities of management. These priorities
then focused upon the financial capacities of business opera-
14 It is interesting to note that normative economists of the 1960s who fol-
lowed Canning [1929, p. 319] believed practicing accountants were not inter-
ested in distribution [Chambers, 1966, p. 99].
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tions to fund future operations as directors thought best, and to
distribute periodic dividends which were fair to shareholders
collectively [French, 1977, p. 322]. In doing so, the courts rel-
egated capital maintenance to a policy option of management
[Littleton, 1953, p. 23]. A common theme that links accounting
principles is the recognition of the rights of stakeholders under
the specific circumstances in question. With respect to the
specific circumstances encountered, no two legal disputes were
identical.
Prior to 1889, Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel, pro-
vided a number of interpretations of the capital maintenance
notion that were seemingly consistent with the intentions of the
legislature at the time.15 The model balance sheet annexed to
Table A clearly indicated, by its format, that the amount consid-
ered available for dividends was to be discovered by deducting
from the value of total assets the sums owing to outsiders to-
gether with the amount credited as paid up on the share capital.
Consequently, the view emerged that dividends: (1) could not be
paid out of capital; and (2) could only be paid out of profits.
Furthermore, the two restrictions were ostensibly treated as syn-
onymous. Both were interpreted to mean that only the surplus
of net assets over paid up capital could be divided.
After 1889, an alternative interpretation began to gain as-
cendancy. By substituting the legal notion of capital with con-
cepts of ‘fixed’ and ‘circulating’ capital [Dicksee, 1916, p. 14;
Yamey, 1941, p. 280], and by rejecting the idea that legal prece-
dent did not permit companies to pay dividends if net assets
were less than the paid up share capital, the reforming judges
were able to provide important freedoms to businessmen with
respect to dividend policy. Furthermore, they were able to main-
tain consistency with the broader legal precedent that dividends
must not be paid out of ‘capital’ [French, 1977, p. 318]. How-
ever, in the process the courts significantly undermined the im-
portance of the surplus method of accounting measurement in
favor of the profit and loss account method. This followed an
emphasis on production rather than on consumption, a focus
which had existed since larger firms emerged in numbers during
the 17th century [Howard, 1932].
15 For instance, re Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Company (1877) 4. Ch.D.
327, re Dronfield Silkstone Coal Company (1877) 17. Ch.D. 76, re National Funds
Assurance Company (1878) L.R. 10. Ch.D. 118, Dent v. London Tramways Com-
pany (1880) 16. Ch.D. 344 and re Exchange Banking Company (Flitcroft’s Case)
(1882) 21. Ch.D. 518.
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By suggesting that the two major legal limitations in fact
had different meanings, the judiciary managed to maintain con-
sistency with the precedent that dividends should only ever be
paid out of profits. However, profits were no longer necessarily
tied to the surplus of net assets over paid up share capital, as
was evident from the findings in Verner v General and Commer-
cial Investment Trust (1894).16 While attempting to distinguish
between circulating and fixed capital for the purposes of profit
measurement, Lindley, L.J. concluded that:
Perhaps the shortest way of expressing the distinction
which I am endeavouring to explain is to say that fixed
capital may be sunk and lost and yet the excess of cur-
rent receipts over current payments may be divided, but
that floating or circulating capital must be kept up as
otherwise it would enter into and form part of such
excess, in which case to divide such excess without de-
ducting the capital which forms part of it will be con-
trary to the law.
Similar views were expressed by judges in other cases.17
The adoption of notions of fixed and circulating capital was
also likely to have been aided by the increasing use of the double
account system [Dicksee, 1895, pp. 117-120; Yamey, 1962;
Edwards, 1985, p. 19], which actually presupposes a distinction
between fixed and circulating capital [Cooper, 1888, p. 744].
However, because neither circulating nor fixed capital could be
defined without reference to the specific accounting situations
and strategies from which they had arisen, the courts relied
increasingly upon management and company objectives to aid
in establishing distributable profit for legislative purposes. Fur-
thermore, where there was no suggestion of illegal activity or
bad faith, the courts deferred to accepted accounting practice
and therefore maximized management’s opportunities to act
and provide on-going distributions to shareholders [Yamey,
1962, pp. 430-431].
Critical to the acceptance and promulgation of these views
was their compatibility with other forms of creditor protection,
such as the solvency rule [French, 1977]. The solvency rule,
whereby it was illegal for a company to pay a dividend if to do
16 2. Ch. 239.
17 Binney v Ince Hall Coal and Cannel Company (1866) 35. L.J. Ch. 363; Lord
Rokeby v Elliot (1880) 41. L.T. 537, modifying (1878) 38. L.T. 846; and Ammonia
Soda Company Limited v Chamberlain (1918) 1. Ch.D. 208.
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so would make the company insolvent, was first introduced in
the Companies Act, 1855 (section 9). Although the provision was
carried over to the Companies Act, 1856 (section 14), it was
subsequently omitted from the Companies Act, 1862. Neverthe-
less, the solvency rule clearly made an impression on the judi-
ciary at the time, and appears to have had an on-going influence
over judicial reasoning.18
French [1977, p. 320] suggests that the similarities between
the solvency rule and other contemporary legal requirements,
such as the fiduciary duties contained in trust law, encouraged
the courts to adopt the solvency rule as a guide to creditor pro-
tection. Nevertheless, having real world references in the form
of liquidity and leverage, the solvency rule was less likely to
constitute an arbitrary constraint over management’s ability to
control and direct longer-term business activities, particularly
the provision of on-going distributions to shareholders.19 Conse-
quently, the rule was able to provide a guide to minimum credi-
tor protection without inhibiting legitimate trading activities.
EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL MAINTENANCE ISSUES
Authority for the Distribution: The authority and legitimacy of
the dividend distribution appear to have been foremost amongst
the concerns of the judiciary and on many occasions these pri-
orities overrode the upholding of agency type contracts. For in-
stance, in MacDougall v. Jersey Imperial Hotel Co. (1864),20 Sir
W. Page Wood held that the payment of dividends during a
period when there were no revenues clearly amounted to a pay-
ment out of capital and, therefore, was illegal.21 Subsequent
18 Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1889) 41. Ch.D. 1; Verner v. General
and Commercial Investment Trust (1894) 2. Ch. 239; in re National Bank of Wales
(1900-1903) All E.R. Rep. 484; Dovey and the Metropolitan Banks of England and
Wales Limited v. John Cory (1901) A.C. 477; and Wilmer v. McNamara and Co.
Ltd. (1895) 2. Ch.D. 245.
19 Lubbock v. British Bank of South America (1892) 2 Ch.D. 198; Ammonia
Soda Company Limited v. Chamberlain (1918) 1. Ch.D. 208; and Dimbula Valley
(Ceylon) Tea Co. Limited v. Laurie (1961) 1. All E.R. 769.
20 2 H.& M. 528.
21 It should also be noted that in 1864 there were no statutory provisions
requiring companies to pay dividends out of profit and that the rule was invoked
on the basis of public policy [Ford et al., 1999, p. 40]. See also re Ebbw Vale
Steel, Iron and Coal Company (1877) 4. Ch.D. 827, re National Funds Assurance
Company (1878) L.R. 10. Ch.D. 118, Guinness v. Land Corporation of Ireland
(1882) L.R. 22. Ch.D. 349, re Alexandra Palace Company (1882) 21. Ch.D. 149 and
Flitcroft’s Case (1882) 21. Ch.D. 519.
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cases overwhelmingly confirmed the view that dividend pay-
ments could not be made to shareholders where there are no
‘profits’ reported, even where private contracts guaranteed such
payments.22
If it was clear that individual stakeholder rights were not at
risk, the courts most often appeared satisfied to enforce express
agency-type agreements stipulating the use of particular ac-
counting methods for profit and dividend determination. This is
consistent with the view that the judiciary reasoned downwards
from evolving customs and legislative provisions to non-compli-
ance with agency contracts. For example, in Davison v Gilles
(1879),23 Jessel, M.R. concluded that in the company’s articles,
profits meant ‘net’ profits, principally “ . . . because you do not
get a reserve fund at all until you have paid your current ex-
penses” [p.193n].24
Accounting principles and practices, or more precisely the
numbers they generate, are often used to define competing
property rights between contracting parties [Watts, 1977]. How-
ever, with respect to judicial priorities the need to uphold spe-
cific rights established under agency contracts overrode the ex-
pectation that companies should comply with generally accepted
accounting principles and procedures. As long as neither the
legislation nor creditors’ protection had been violated, the re-
quirements of the articles of association were respected. For
instance, in Dent v London Tramways Co. (1880),25 Jessel, M.R.
sanctioned the payment of a preference dividend on the basis
that, in accordance with the companies articles, there existed a
profit for the year. Therefore, to have decided otherwise would
have caused an obvious injustice [Yamey, 1962, p. 441]. Like-
wise, in Lambert v Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1882), Bacon,
L.J. rejected the claim that the company should provide for de-
preciation of a long-lived mining lease on the grounds that the
company’s articles required no such reserves to be established.
Bacon suggested that although Jessel’s definition of ‘net’ profits
22 See also Salisbury v Metropolitan Railway (1870)(2) 22. L.T. 839, re Oxford
Benefit Building and Investment Society (1886) L.R. 35. Ch.D. 502, Trevor v
Whitworth (1887) 21. App. Cas. 409, Leeds Estate, Building and Investment Com-
pany v Shepherd (1887) L.R. 36. Ch.D. 787 and re Walters’ Deed of Guarantee
(1933) 1. Ch. 321.
23 16. Ch.D. 347n.
24 See also Dent v London Tramways Co. (1880) 16. Ch.D. 344 and Kehoe v
The Waterford & Limerick Railway Co. (1888) L.R. 21, Ir. Ch.D. 221.
25 16. Ch.D. 344.
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in Davison v Gilles (1879) was no doubt appropriate in the cir-
cumstances of that case, Neuchatel Asphalte’s articles stated
otherwise [pp. 884-885].26 Similar reasoning to this was used
subsequently in the Lee case.
In the lower court proceedings of the Lee case, Stirling, J.
had refused to enjoin a dividend since the plaintiffs had failed to
prove that the value of the company’s assets had deteriorated
[Kitchen, 1974, p. 124].27 Stirling, J. indicated that his views on
capital maintenance were closely aligned to those of Jessel’s
[Reid, 1987b, p. 251 and footnote 19].28 However, he suggested
that at some future time the company might have to set apart a
substantial sum to represent depreciation in the value of the con-
cession. This implies that at the time the charging of depreciation
was regarded as indicative of the making of a good faith valuation
of assets and that, provided there was nothing to suggest manage-
ment had acted illegally, capital was being maintained [French,
1977, p. 309].29 Nevertheless, the charging of depreciation was not
compulsory, and specific rights established under agency con-
tracts could in fact override the requirement that companies com-
ply with generally accepted accounting principles.
Transparency of Distributional Effects: Another important influ-
ence over judicial reasoning with respect to dividend payments
was the transparency of the profit calculations and the fairness
of the resulting distribution. By adopting such a viewpoint, the
courts were compelled to concentrate on specific revenues and
expenses within the overriding considerations of the objectives
of management and the company. For instance, in Bale v
Cleland (1864),30 Martin, J. agreed with the company’s account-
ing treatment of preliminary expenses on the basis that allo-
cating capitalized cost as an expense over future periods was
consistent with the accounting practices adopted by railway
26 Furthermore, Bacon, L.J. suggested that while “ . . . the Court will interfere
to redress any wrongs, . . . the Court never interferes to prescribe to companies
what they shall do as to their own internal affairs” (p. 883).
27 Not only had the terms and size of the concession recently been extended,
but it was also being held on more favorable terms than had originally been the
case.
28 As suggested by Yamey [1941, p. 277], Stirling, J. “ . . . merely reaffirmed
the earlier series of decisions”.
29 For instance, Binney v Ince Hall Coal and Cannel Company (1866) 35 L.J.
Ch. 363 and Mills v Northern Railway of Buenos Ayres Company (1870) L.R. 5.
Ch.App. 621.
30 4. F. & F. 117.
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companies in similar circumstances at the time. However, the
court rejected the company’s treatment of expenditure incurred
for research and development purposes as it had been applied in
an arbitrary manner. Subsequent cases generally affirmed the
courts’ acceptance of companies capitalizing preliminary expen-
ditures when applied in a systematic manner and when consis-
tently confirmed by the company’s auditor [Best, 1885, p. 573;
Dicksee, 1895, p. 55].31
The courts focus on specific revenues and expenses as they
applied to management’s objectives was also evident in the Lee
case, and a number of cases that followed Lee. By emphasizing
the distinction between capital and revenue accounts, both
Lopes, L.J. and Lindley, L.J. averted the possibility of including
accretions or diminutions of capital in the determination of
profits.32 In doing so, the presiding judges effectively focused the
legal fraternity’s attention upon commercial and accounting is-
sues, such as the significance of the accounting principle of
revenue recognition [Littleton, 1953; Myers, 1959], rather than
on a broad definition including principles of capital mainte-
nance [Ford, 1993, p. 100].
Because most of the cases dealing with depreciation heard
prior to Lee did not involve mining assets,33 recognized opinion
at the time suggested that the Lee decision may have applied
only to companies working with wasting assets [Morris, 1986,
p.72]. Nevertheless, Lee marked the beginning of a succession of
court cases that further undermined the capital maintenance
concept as a means of determining profit for the purposes of
dividend distribution [Morris, 1984, p. 59].34 It also highlighted
the role of management and company objectives in determining
the distinction between fixed and circulating assets. For in-
stance, in Verner v General and Commercial Investment Trust
(1894),35 the court sanctioned a dividend from income received
31 For instance, Turquand v Marshall (1869) 20. L.T. 766, Rance’s Case (1870)
L.R. 6. Ch. App. 104 and re Oxford Benefit Building and Investment Society (1886)
L.R. 35. Ch.D. 502.
32 See also Glenville Pastoral Co. Pty. Ltd. v. FCT (1963) 109. C.L.R. 199 and
BTR Nylex v. Churchill International Inc. (1992) 9. A.C.S.R. 361.
33 Davison v. Gillies (1879) 16. Ch.D. 347n; Dent v. London Tramways Co.
(1880) 16. Ch.D. 334; and Leeds Estate, Building and Investment Society Ltd. v.
Shepherd (1887) 36. Ch.D. 787.
34 Re Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Company (1877) 4. Ch.D. 827; Re
Dronfield Silkstone Coal Company (1877) 17. Ch.D. 76; Dent v. London Tramways
Company (1880) 16. Ch.D. 344; and Lawrence v. West Somerset Mineral Railway
Company (1918) 2. Ch. 250.
35 2. Ch. 239.
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from securities despite the trustees failing to make good the loss
in the value of the securities. However, Stirling, J. did suggest
that had the company been an ordinary trading company his
decision would have been different.36
Cases subsequent to Lee further reinforced the courts’ rights
to consider each case presented on its own merits. For instance,
in the case of Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co. (1902),37 prefer-
ence shareholders had urged that a dividend payment be made
on the grounds that the losses arising from the flooding of
mines and miners’ cottages on a lease of mining rights could be
ignored. However, in his judgment Farwell, J. declared that his
opinion coincided with that of the experts, inasmuch as he
thought that the money invested in these items (mines, etc.) was
properly regarded in this company as circulating capital. Conse-
quently, losses caused by the flooding had first to be made good
before distributable profits were calculated [Ford and Austin,
1995, p. 666]. Following the precedent established in Dovey v
Cory (1901),38 Farwell, J. stated that:
. . . the real question for determination, therefore, is
whether there are profits available for distribution and
this is to be answered according to the circumstances of
each particular case, the nature of the company, and the
evidence of competent witnesses (emphasis added).39
Underpinning the judicial decisions described above was
the court’s wish to avoid any ruling which could fetter the legiti-
mate activities of the company under the particular conditions
encountered [Littleton, 1953, Ch.11]. For instance, Lindley ar-
gued in the Lee case that it was not for the court to interfere in
the activities of businessmen, particularly as there had been no
suggestion of bad faith. Lindley also suggested that the
appellant’s argument that capital be maintained at all costs
should be dismissed. By entertaining such ideas the court was
being invited “to lay down certain principles, the adoption of
which would paralyze the trade of the country”.40 Lindley had
36 See also Bolton v Natal Land and Colonisation Co. (1892) 2. Ch. 124 and re
Kingston Cotton Mills Co., No.2 (1896) 1. Ch. 331.
37 1. Ch. 353.
38 Dovey and the Metropolitan Banks of England and Wales Limited v John
Cory (1901) A.C. 477.
39 Interestingly, Farwell would have come to the same conclusion whether he
had followed the House of Lords in re National Bank of Wales (1900-1903) All
E.R. Rep. 484 at 365, or if he had followed the Court of Appeal’s Lee ruling.
40 41. Ch.D. 1, at 24.
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based his views on the fact that the legislation contained no
direct reference to the payment of dividends [Yamey, 1941, pp.
277-278].
Managerial Freedom to Provide for the On-Going Capacity for Dis-
tribution: While the findings in the Lee case did not require
depreciation to be charged on fixed assets in that particular
case, nothing in the judges’ findings forbid the practice outright.
This appears to be borne out by the limited impact the Lee case
had on the rate of adoption of depreciation accounting amongst
British mining companies [Morris, 1986]. Of paramount con-
cern to the judges was that funds should not be arbitrarily
locked into business entities that may not have any immediate
or longer-term prospects. Thus, the Lee decision was not so
much a special situation only generally applicable to companies
working wasting assets [Morris, 1986, p. 72], but a special situa-
tion which was only generally applicable to companies operat-
ing specific projects with limited lives.
In the Lee case, the directors did not intend that the com-
pany would carry on the business in perpetuity. Consequently,
there was little point in providing for the continuity of the asset
[Dicksee, 1895, pp. 128-129; Morris, 1986, p. 72]. However, in
cases where the charging of depreciation was considered appro-
priate for the circumstances, the courts held that the
businessman’s view on depreciation should be accepted.41 Con-
sequently, the role of depreciation in company accounting was
interpreted by the courts to facilitate continuity of the firm in its
environment where continuity was an objective of management.
Where it was not, real world outcomes from the reporting pro-
cess itself, such as dividend restriction, were not supported by
principles which were unfair in the context.
General acceptance of the profit and loss method by manag-
ers may well have guided the courts towards the view that funds
should not be arbitrarily locked into business entities. For in-
stance, it was conventional under the profit and loss system that
fixed assets were neither valued nor depreciated [Jones and
Aiken, 1994, p. 204]. Nevertheless, the profit and loss method
still permitted managers to charge depreciation if the circum-
stance warranted. In contrast, profit determination under the
surplus approach required entities to incorporate changes in the
value of all their assets, including non-current and fixed assets,
41 For instance, Rishton v Grissell (1868) L.R. 5. Eq. 326 and Kehoe v The
Waterford & Limerick Railway Co. (1888) L.R. 21, Ir. Ch.D. 221.
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in the computation of profit [Kehl, 1976, pp. 3-13; Revsine,
1981; Jones and Aiken, 1994, p. 201].
While cases subsequent to Lee did little to clarify the main
problems with capital maintenance issues, they did confirm the
trend in the post-Lee decisions [Yamey, 1941, p. 282]. For in-
stance, when the National Bank of Wales case reached the House
of Lords as Dovey v Cory (1901),42 the view was taken that rigid
rules could be potentially disastrous to companies:
People put their money into a trading company to give
them an income, and the sudden stoppage of all divi-
dends would send down the value of their shares to
zero and possibly involve its ruin.
Judicial hesitation over forcing trading entities to retain
funds beyond an amount which was considered ‘economically
sensible’ diminished any opportunities to make the capital
maintenance concept explicit. However, as the continuity of a
harmonious relationship between shareholders and manage-
ment depends on the regular payment of dividends as well as
management’s control over strategy formation, the law’s conces-
sion was of great value. It also provided a means by which the
judges could ensure capital was not bound up in any particular
investment profile. Nevertheless, if there had been any confu-
sion surrounding the issue of paying dividends out of the excess
of receipts over current expenses despite fixed capital being lost,
the National Bank of Wales case was probably the best opportu-
nity available to the judiciary to re-establish the position taken
prior to 1889. However, the judiciary declined to take up this
opportunity [French, 1977, pp. 314-316], the Lord Chancellor
doubting whether dividend questions could ever be treated in
the abstract at all [Yamey, 1962, p. 436]. Furthermore, the capi-
tal maintenance principle enunciated in the Lee case, that busi-
ness matters are the province of business men, was reaffirmed
by the highest tribunal [Yamey, 1962, p. 437].
The findings in subsequent cases, such as Lawrence v West
Somerset Mineral Ry. (1918),43 established conclusively that the
judiciary had clearly rejected the doctrine of capital mainte-
nance. While the payment of a dividend and the imminent ter-
mination of the lease on the firm’s principal asset would have
left inadequate assets to repay the bondholders in the event of
42 Dovey and the Metropolitan Banks of England and Wales Limited v John
Cory (1901) A.C. 477.
43 2. Ch. 250.
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dissolution, the court refused to intervene on behalf of the bond-
holders because the dividend was being paid out of divisible
profits [Yamey, 1962, p. 437].
CONCLUSIONS
Principles, conventions and rules of science-based profes-
sions have respected, sustained and empowered the method-
ological precedents of their respective disciplines over time. This
is especially so in the human and biological sciences [Dewey,
1939, 1947; Foucault, 1970, p. 363; Grene, 1985, p. 7]. In this
sense decisions of the courts in the 19th century and the associ-
ated schema of Littleton [1953, Ch. 1, 5, 8 & 12] presume a
continuing duty to avoid epistemological anomalies and unfair
outcomes in practice. These might be associated with the use of
microeconomic theories. That is, accounting choices imposed
on management which give rise to values and other amounts
which lack congruency with managerial strategies could distort
accounting practices for the firm as a whole in its specific and
continuing environment. These numbers potentially lack au-
thenticity as traditional justifications, being a first step in
knowledge towards the discovery and establishment of a new
‘situation’ for observation and analysis [Dewey, 1939, Ch. 6;
Grene, 1985, pp. 7-8]. They might also lack the capacity to facili-
tate understanding of pre-conditions as analytical observations,
thus necessitating change to methodological traditions
[Hopwood, 1987].
On numerous occasions both before and after the Lee case
British courts were asked to adjudicate on the appropriateness
of particular measurement methods for the purposes of divi-
dend determination. In general, the judges exhibited a consis-
tency in their decision-making. Furthermore, no substantial evi-
dence exists to suggest that the courts took the view that
longer-term management strategies should be subsumed by an-
nual disclosure of current ‘value to the owner’ calculations un-
der the surplus method. Judicial attempts to understand ac-
counting valuations as they related to distributional issues were
predominantly concerned with management capacity to control
and direct business activities and to determine on-going distri-
butions to shareholders, particularly in the longer-term [Yamey,
1941; Littleton, 1953]. Consequently, it has been argued here
that the British courts rejected the surplus method of profit
determination for distributive purposes on the grounds that as a
methodology it is insufficiently robust to envisage many of the
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specific risk factors, estimates of cash flows and resultant divi-
dend distributions incorporated into management’s planning
horizons [Bell et al., 1997].
Hopwood [1987] may have divined the element of tradi-
tional accounting practice as determined by the courts from his
observations of the transformation of Josiah Wedgwood’s ac-
counting system (1772) for the firm as a whole. This was in its
overall role of matching performance of the firm to its environ-
ment. The matching principle based on relevant costing has
been established in Europe since the 17th century [Howard,
1932, p. 93]. Unless facing a perfect market [Beaver and Demski,
1979], this ethic for matching under double entry cannot be
displaced by selection of historic or current market prices, al-
though they may be used as proximate prices for justification of
unexpired costs under the traditional production emphasis.
Thus, when Wedgwood established his new system based on
accounting practices relevant to both the strategies and the deci-
sion structure of the organization as a whole, then innovative
qualities empowering origin and persistence of accounting prac-
tices could come into play:
The fine details of the production process could now be
related to the aims and performance of the organization
as a whole. Policies created at the top of the organiza-
tion could be related to specific aspects of organiza-
tional functioning” [Hopwood, 1987, p. 218].
In other words, Hopwood’s basic measurement structure should
ultimately be related downwards to Kaplan and Norton’s [2001a;
2001b; 2004] ‘balanced scorecard’ for congruence with estab-
lished and on-going management strategies and related profiles.
The basic ethic of accounting measurement captures the
spirit of traditional macro evolutionary practice and legal prece-
dents where periodic evaluation of prospects and strategies for
the firm as a whole becomes aligned with management aware-
ness under the profit and loss method favored by the courts.
Accordingly, the judiciary did not prohibit the use of economic
concepts such as depreciation. Rather it was a discretionary
responsibility of managers who would be expected to justify the
calculations and the resulting periodic financial outcomes
[Dicksee, 1895, pp. 128-129; Morris, 1986, p. 72]. Littleton, al-
though an economist, followed the tradition and suggested that
“ . . . depreciation measures the productive contribution of the
asset in question” [1953, pp. 212-213]. However, without justifi-
cation he chose to adopt the expedient solution of linking peri-
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odic assessment of asset prices and depreciation to ‘invested
cost’ in market places, being generalized historic cost. Despite
protestations to the contrary [1953, Ch. 2, 5 & 8], this historical
market price process turns his profit and loss structure into a
quasi-surplus method having no status in periodic reporting. It
mandates depreciation as an accounting principle, a process not
endorsed by the British courts under the double entry reification
of management responsibilities for control in financial terms.
Traditionally, market prices of any kind are proximate prices
and surrogates for ‘objectivity’ in practice. The do not imply the
‘essence’ of periodic accounting measurement [Hopwood, 1987,
p. 211]. Under Littleton’s [1953] macro-evolutionary approach,
costs become outputs as benefits to the community as a whole;
revenues are compensation to the entity; and profits are rewards
[p. 95].
This ethic of justification would have been seen by the Brit-
ish courts as driving the double entry system for the firm as a
whole entity in practice; not current market prices as increases
of value to the owner being an economic reference to periodic
capital maintenance. However, this only applies if business in-
stitutions have not given up long-term planning for production
in favor of shorter-term asset revaluation to enrich speculation
in the buying and selling of securities.
While microeconomic measures of market prices may be
relevant in certain specific circumstances, they may not of them-
selves provide outside of perfect markets a picture of the firm’s
whole performance under managerial strategies [Bell et al.,
1997]. For instance, a study of Lindley, L.J. in re London and
General Bank (no.2) (1895)44 shows that more than the discovery
and ‘adding up’ of market prices is required for the inde-
pendence and competence of auditors. In addition, the distinc-
tion between circulating and fixed capital has come to be gener-
ally regarded as arbitrary and, therefore, unworkable for the
purposes of economic-based models of profit measurement
[Cooper, 1894, p. 1041; Revsine, 1973; Prakash and Sunder,
1979; Samuelson, 1980]. Nevertheless, this has failed to this day
to inhibit the general acceptance in practice of costing methods
based broadly upon fixed and variable concepts. These are aids
in determining congruence with management strategies unless
constrained by the ‘lower of cost and market’ rule [Aiken and
Ardern, 2003].
44 2 Ch.673; 64 L.J. Ch. 866.
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In more recent times, accounting standard setters in Britain
and Commonwealth countries such as Australia have adopted a
different approach to that of the British judiciary. In an attempt
to restrict the role of managerial judgment, policy makers have
increasingly sought to limit the permissible number of classifi-
cation, measurement and transformation procedures [Brom-
wich, 1985, p. 1; Taylor and Turley, 1986, p. 1; Langfield-Smith,
1990, p. 6]. Policy makers have also recommended that eco-
nomic values be allowed under professional accounting stan-
dards and that companies produce abridged financial reports.
Many of these changes appear to be reactions to events such as
corporate collapses that reveal systematic abuses of accounting
procedures. However, some appear to be reactions against his-
torical cost as a general rule. The first step toward avoidance of
disclosure type losses is, however, enforcement of managerial
valuation obligations.
The British courts in the 19th century clearly assumed that
the legislators had not intended to force companies to disclose
periodic changes only in the market prices of fixed assets where
management’s strategies were longer-term. Moreover, they ap-
preciated that these reporting behaviors could diminish on-go-
ing economic opportunities and social responsibilities, and thus
potentially restrain management’s capacity to plan and to adapt
to new challenges for the firm. Instead, the courts focused on
the periodic matching of costs (‘efforts’) and revenues (‘accom-
plishments’), and whether there existed a congruency between
the measurement of costs (both expired and unexpired) and
management’s long-term strategies.
If something different to a periodic overall macro portrayal
of the whole firm under management’s strategies in its specific
evolving environment for continuity is required in the modern
era, then governments, economists, stock market analysts, liqui-
dators and potential investors may need to be prepared to spon-
sor individual specialized reports. This is how markets for micro
information should work in a free-enterprise society [Beaver,
1981]. As for capital maintenance, environmental factors relat-
ing to a diversity of planning horizons and risks have varied, but
not necessarily or generally corrupted, choice of accounting
measures under standardization [Aiken and Ardern, 2003]. His-
torically, a need for objectivity and economic measurement for
the community did not cloud the focus of the British courts on
management’s mission as the longer-term criterion of financial
success. This may provide relevance for accounting assessments
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of unexpired costs as congruent residuals of periodic activity
[Littleton, 1953, p. 98].
The courts in 19th century Britain would have been aware
that the emergence of large-scale private organizations facing
imperfect markets since the end of the 17th century had given
emphasis to accounting for relevant costs with a focus on pro-
duction, not consumption [Canning, 1929, p. 319; Howard,
1932, p. 93]. Relevant costing for ‘unexpired costs’ [Littleton,
1953, Ch. 5] is not the expediency of generalized historical costs.
It must be congruent with management strategies for the orga-
nization as a whole under the double entry based profit and loss
approach [Hopwood, 1987, p. 218; Bell et al., 1997]. Away from
complete and competitive markets [Nickel, 1995], macro-evolu-
tionary accounting reports of this nature cannot be reduced gen-
erally to scientific laws and principles of microeconomics as a
theoretical and legal ideal under capital maintenance hypoth-
eses or related efficiency criteria [Shwayder, 1967; Beaver and
Demski, 1979; Ayala, 1985].
Financial accounting and auditing has often focused on the
application of historic and later current market prices, for busi-
nesses operating in complete and competitive markets. How-
ever, the avoidance of too heavy reliance on such prices, and
emphasis on relevant cost control by management congruent
with overall strategies (Kaplan and Norton, 2004), not simply
upon the collection of more revenues in the shorter-term, is
pertinent. Such cost control is pivotal to the extent of innovation
and future profit sharing in imperfect markets.
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